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COMMENTS
THE ANTITRUST LAWS AND LABOR
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent decades the question of concentration of economic power within
labor unions has been the source of much controversy and debate.' The
method of regulating the effects of this power constitutes the core of several
labor statutes presently in force. 2 Despite these statutory provisions, bow-
ever, many of the economic problems inherent in such a situation still remain
unsolved. 3 The reason for this predicament, it has been suggested,' lies in
the almost complete immunity from federal antitrust statutes which labor
unions presently enjoy. At common law, certain labor activities were held to
be restraints of trade and consequently illegal., Similarly, the first federal anti-
trust law, the Sherman Act, was also applicable to labor unions.0 Subsequent
legislation 7 and court interpretation,8 however, have dealt with unions more
generously and have created the "labor antitrust exemption."
A. Labor Market and Product Market
When speaking of labor and antitrust, it is fundamental to distinguish be-
tween the labor market and the product market. The two markets are closely
related in that the buyer in the former, management, is the seller in the latter.
Further, since "the price of a commodity tends to equal its cost of produc-
1. See Ierman, Labor Monopoly Problems, 38 A.B.AJ. 743 (1952); Kelley, Should
Labor Unions Be Subject to Anti-Trust Laws? Yes., 36 Mlich. S.B.J. 24 (1957); Segal,
Labor Unions and Monopoly, 66 Corn. LJ. 33 (1961). It should be noted that the 1961-1962
national intercollegiate debate topic is: Resolved: That Labor Organizations Should Be
Under the Jurisdiction of Anti-Trust Legislation; see Walch, Debate Handbook on Anti-
trust Laws and Labor (1961); cf. Krock, In the Nation, N.Y. Times, April 19, 1962,
p. 30, col. 4.
2. Norris-LaGuardia Act §§ 1-15, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-10,
113-15 (1953); Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 151-67, 171-82, 13-S, 191-97 (1953) (Supp. II, 1959-190); Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531
(Supp. II, 1959-1960).
3. See notes 27-45 infra and accompanying text.
4. See Chamberlin, The Economic Analysis of Labor Union Power (1958); Pound,
Legal Immunities of Labor Unions (1957).
5. See Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1342). The King v. journeymen-
Taylors, 3 Mod. 10, 8S Eng. Rep. 9 (K.B. 1721). See also Dooley, Antitrust Le",iation
and Labor Unions, 11 Lab. LJ. 911, 915 (1960).
6. 26 Stat. 209 (1390), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1953).
7. Clayton Antitrust Act §§ 6, 20, 33 Stat. 731 (1914), 1s U.S.C. § 17 (1953); 33
Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (195); Norris-LaGuardia Act § 5, 47 Stat. 71 (1932),
29 U.S.C. § 105 (1958).
S. See Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 321 (1945); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1945); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219
(1941); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
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tion,"9 and since wages represent a large portion of these costs, it would
appear that the two markets are inexorably linked. Yet, an essential difference
exists with respect to the subject matter of each; 10 the labor market is con-
cerned with the purchase and sale of employees' services, while the product
market involves transactions in the company's product.
Monopoly power has been defined as the power to fix prices or to exclude
competition."' On this basis, there can be no doubt that unions possess such
capabilities. It is of the very nature and purpose of every labor organization
that it be able to eliminate competition in the labor market.' 2 It is only when
labor possesses this monopoly power in the labor market that a range for
collective bargaining appears at all. Since the employer is a powerful single
unit on his side, while the employee is typically a very small part of the larger
aggregate, there is clearly an overwhelming case for sanctioning collective
action by labor in an effort to establish a single unit to negotiate with manage-
ment. 3 Thus, it is not suggested that the antitrust laws should be applied to
the labor market as such.' 4 This is true even though unions may use monopoly
power to influence the price paid for labor on an industry-wide basis and
consequently indirectly affect competition in the product market. 1 But, when
labor unions engage in practices such as banning new products or processes,
exerting pressures against individuals and firms not parties to a labor dispute
(secondary boycotts), dividing up territories, restricting output so as to control
market prices, excluding various commodities from the product market, and
directly participating in price-fixing agreements, they engage in activities which
directly restrain trade in the product market, and which if engaged in by man-
agement would, in many cases, be violative of the antitrust laws.
B. Applicable Statutes
Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes "every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States ... illegal. .". ."10 The Supreme Court has qualified
this prohibition to the extent that the word "every" must be interpreted in
each case with due consideration as to whether the conduct being reviewed
constitutes an undue restraint of competitive conditions, or a monopolization,
or an attempt to monopolize. This standard gives the courts discretion to
decide whether conduct is significantly and unreasonably anticompetitive in
character and effect-the "rule of reason."' 7 Certain activities, however, by
9. This is the "law of cost." See Chamberlin, op. cit. supra note 4, at 32, 34.
10. Id. at 31.
11. See, e.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
12. Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev.
252, 254-55 (1955).
13. Chamberlin, op. cit. supra note 4, at 15.
14. Cox, supra note 12, at 254-55.
15. Ibid.
16. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
17. See United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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reason of their very nature or necessary effect are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable. Thus, any arrangement, which, either directly 8 or by controlling
production,'9 fixes or stabilizes prices, or which unduly restricts "competitive
opportunity or commercial freedom" is deemed a per se violation of section V:'3
Section 2 states: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monop-
olize or combine or conspire ... to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States . . . [is] guilty of a misdemeanor .... "
Under this provision "economic monopoly becomes illegal monopolization not
only (1) if it was achieved or preserved by conduct violating section 1 but
also (2) if it was, even by restrictions not prohibited by section 1, ddiberatdy
obtained or maintained."2' Thus the element of purposiveness or deliberateness
becomes essential to the existence of a section 2 violation.23
H. UNION ACTMTiEs
A. Gernral
In examining these activities we must at all times distinguish between those
which have valid union objectives, and those which are aimed solely at direct
control of the product market. The latter, more recent decisions have held, do
not constitute a "labor dispute" and therefore are not within the antitrust
exemption.2 4  It is those activities which have as their ends valid union
objectives-wages, terms and conditions of employment, etc.-to which the
exemption is applicable.2 -5 The issue then, is whether these practices, when
they cause anticompetitive effects prohibited by the antitrust laws, should be
restricted, notwithstanding the objectives involved. Assuming that it is desir-
18. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
19. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v.
American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923); American Column & Lumber Co. v.
United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
20. Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 12 (1955). See International Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tying arrangement held per se violation under Section
1 of Sherman Act and Section 3 of Clayton Act); Fashion Originators' Guild of America
v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (group boycott is per se violative of Section 1 of Sherman
Act); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 38 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1593), aftd, 175
U.S. 211 (1899) (division of markets held per se violation of Section 1 of Sherman Act);
cf. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1953S) (tying arrangement held per se
violation under Section 3 of Clayton Act).
21. 26 Stat. 209 (1S90), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1953).
22. Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 43 (1955). (Emphasis added.)
23. It should be noted that the "element of 'delibemtenezs' or 'purposE,' distinguishing
economic monopoly from the offences of monopolization differs from the more demanding
concept of 'specific intent' relevant where the offence alleged is an attempt to monopolize."
Ibid. In cases of attempt to monopolize, proof of a specific or subjective intent to accom-
plish an unlawful result is required. Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928).
24. See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (application
of state antitrust statute); AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 53 (1949);
Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 33S US. 52S (1949);
UWhitaker -v% North Carolina, 335 U.S. 325 (1949).
25. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
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able to restrict such activities, further problems arise as to how it can be done.
Should the antitrust exemption be withdrawn-either totally or partially-thus
making labor in some way subject to antitrust laws, or should certain activities
be declared unlawful under the labor statutes? Assuming that the antitrust
exemption is removed, would this require amendment of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act? 26 Or, on the other hand, are there any alternatives to the "labor" and
"antitrust" approaches? Before discussing these problems, it is important
to note those union activities which have resulted in anticompetitive effects.
B. Specific Activities
A union's demands against the use of labor-saving devices which would
displace its members, or in the alternative, demands that if new machines are
used the same number of men must be employed, have been held legitimate
activities which labor organizations may carry on in an effort to maintain
employment and certain working conditions for their members.27 Thus when
the American Federation of Musicians imposed a ban on phonograph records
and electrical transcriptions in 1942 and considerably reduced the market
supply of these items for almost three years, the union's conduct was held
not subject to the antitrust laws.28 A similar result was reached by the Su-
preme Court when the International Hod Carriers and Common Laborers'
Union struck to prevent the sale and delivery of truck cement-mixers which
would have resulted in a reduction in production costs and considerably in-
creased the supply of ready-mix concrete on the market. 29 On the other hand,
where businessmen have combined to suppress patented inventions or tech-
nological improvements, their conduct has been held a per se antitrust violation. 0
Unions have legally imposed restrictions on production in order to maintain
market prices and thus insure a constant or increasing wage scale-a valid
union objective. Such was the case when the United Mine Workers curtailed
all coal production to three days a week in order to stabilize production and
prices.31 But any agreed-upon curtailment or shutdown by management which
restricts production and fixes prices would constitute a section 1 violation,
regardless of motive, simply because of the combination or conspiracy involved. 2
Unions, seeking to obtain more work for members, have lawfully used their
economic power to compel business enterprises to use only products manu-
26. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-10, 113-15 (1958).
27. See, e.g., United States v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 47 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. I11.
1942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 741 (1943) (per curiam) ; United States v. Carrozzo, 37 F. Supp. 191
(N.D. Ill.), aff'd sub nam. United States v. International Hod Carriers Dist. Council, 313
U.S. 539 (1941) (per curiam).
28. United States v. American Fed'n of Musicians, supra note 27.
29. United States v. Carrozzo, supra note 27.
30. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 431 (1945); Blount Mfg.
Co. v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 166 Fed. 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909).
31. Penello v. UMW, 88 F. Supp. 935 (D.D.C. 1950).
32. See Virginia Excelsior Mills Inc. v. FTC, 256 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1958). See also
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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factured in plants employing members of a certain union.3 3 Often such
demands take the form of contracts under which nonunion employers and
employers and products designated by the union as "unfair" are boycotted.
Thus in New York City the electrical workers union attempted to exclude
from its geographical jurisdiction all nonunion and out-of-city electrical goods.34
Mfore recently, in the Western States, the carpenters' union refused to handle
low cost Canadian shingles because of the competition with local mills. These
practices increase prices and exclude competing products from the consumer
market. On the other hand, where businessmen, acting in concert, refuse to
deal with others, such refusals to deal would be deemed per se violations of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.36
Arrangements whereby industry-wide unions unite on a "one Vage-and-
working conditions" demand, applicable to an entire industry, with a nation-
wide strike as the alternative, have the net result of price fixing through
noncompetition. 37 A conspiracy to fix prices through noncompetition would
amount to a per se antitrust violation if engaged in by management. But
this involves a restraint of competition in the labor market and therefore
concerns a practice which is essential to the existence of labor organizations.
The possibility of applying antitrust policies is therefore dismissed for reasons
of impracticability.
Labor unions may arbitrarily divide up and allocate industries, territories,
and jurisdictions among themselves to the exclusion of competitors.29 If busi-
nessmen entered into similar agreements, they would be guilty of conspiring
to exclude competition, a section 1 violation.10 Yet this device is a common
practice among labor organizations. It is necessary as a means of preserving
the natural union monopoly power in the labor market.
Secondary boycotts involve combinations not merely to refrain from dealing
with a trader or manufacturer, or to advise or persuade his customers to so
33. See, e.g., Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 US. 797
(1945); Washington-Oregon Shingle Weavers' Dist. Council, 101 N.L.R.B. 1159 (1952),
enforcement granted, 211 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1954); cf. Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 US. 321
(1945); United States v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 313 US. 539 (1941) (per curiam).
34. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, supra note 33.
35. Washington-Oregon Shingle Weavers Dist. Council, 101 N.L.R.B. 1159 (1952),
enforcement granted, 211 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1954).
36. See, e.g., M illinery Creators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 US. 469 (1941); Fashion
Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Eastern States Retail
Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
37. See Krock, Legal for Unions, Illegal for Management, US. N'ews & World Report
Dec. 7, 1959, p. 124.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 US. 392 (1927); AznCrican
Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
39. See Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs., Monopoly Power as exercied by labor unions 22 (post 1956
undated memorandum); White, Should Unions Have Monopoly Powers?, Readers Digest
Aug. 1955, p. 33, where the author discusses several territorial division practices.
40. See, e.g, Timlken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Addys-
ton Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), affirming 85 Fed. 271 (6th
Cir. 1sgs).
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refrain (primary boycott), but to exert coercive pressure upon such customers,
actual or prospective, in order to cause them to withhold or withdraw patron-
age from such trader or manufacturer through fear of loss or damage to them-
selves, should they deal with him.41 In the past this device has been used quite
effectively by unions in an effort to compel employers to meet contract demands
respecting wages and conditions of employment.42 Although such practices
have always been unlawful for management under section 1,43 even today
they involve no antitrust violation for labor.44 Nevertheless, unions are not
free to engage in such activities since they constitute an unfair labor practice
under Section 8(b) (4) of the Taft-Hartley Act.45
Thus, the activities of labor organizations which tend to reduce or eliminate
competition may be divided into three classes: those which involve restraints
of trade in the product market and are lawful; those which concern the labor
market; and those which restrict competition in the product market but are
unlawful under labor statutes. Practices in the last two categories are not in
issue since they are either necessary to preserve the union's monopoly in the
labor market or prohibited by the labor statutes. Those of the first, how-
ever, present many problems which, as yet, remain unsolved. The legality of
these activities is dependent upon the scope of the antitrust exemption which
Congress has granted to labor and the construction which the Supreme Court
has given to the immunity concept as it is found in the statutes.
III. HISTORY OF THE EXEMPTION
A. Legislative Immunity
1. Sherman Act of 1890
Upon the passage of the Sherman Act, 46 controversies arose regarding cover-
age and exemptions. When read literally, section 1 prohibited every combina-
tion and conspiracy in restraint of trade whether engaged in by business enter-
prises or by others.47 It was first argued that Congress had intended to exempt
41. See 5 Toulmin, Anti-Trust Laws § 5.32, at 252 (1950); cf. Duplex Printing Press
Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
43. "A combined refusal to deal with anyone as a means of preventing him from deal-
ing with a third person, against whom the combined action is directed, is a boycott; and
a boycott is prima fade unlawful; it must be justified." Fashion Originators' Guild of
America, Inc. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), citing
United States v. American Livestock Comm'n, 279 U.S. 435 (1929).
44. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), where Mr. Justice Stone
pointed out that § 20 of the Clayton Act makes lawful the action of any person "'ceasing
to patronize ...any party to such dispute' or 'recommending, advising, or persuading
others by peaceful and lawful means so to do.'" Id. at 242 (concurring opinion). See
generally Gregory, Union Peacetime Restraints in Collective Bargaining, 10 U. Chl. L.
Rev. 177 (1943).
45. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1958) (Supp. II, 1959-
1960).
46. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1958).
47. Every contract, combination . . .in restraint of trade . . . is declared to be Ille-
labor unions. Since the law as finally enacted, however, expressly omitted
an exemption provision contained in a prior draft, this interpretation was soon
rejected.4 3 Within a few years, several decisions by federal circuit courts indi-
cated approval of this inclusive construction,D but it was not until 1903 that
the Supreme Court determined that labor unions were clearly within the scope
of the act. In Loewe v. Lawlor,5 0 more popularly known as the Danbury Hatters
case, the United Hatters of America imposed a nationwide secondary boycott
against the plaintiff-hat manufacturing company in an effort to compel consent to
a closed shop. The Court held that such action constituted "a combination 'in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,' in the sense in which
those words are used in the [Sherman] act .... ,1 Not until three years later,
however, when the Court ruled that such illegal combinations cou.ld be dis-
solved,52 was the need for political action on the part of labor regarding the
antitrust provisions realized. The result was the inclusion of an apparent
labor exemption clause in the Clayton Act of 1914.r 3
2. Clayton Act of 1914
This act,54 inter alia, granted private parties the right to secure injunctions
against continued violations of both the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts.
But section 6 stated that: "the labor of a human being is not a commodity or
article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed
to forbid the existence and operation of labor . . . organizations. ...
Thus, unions were afforded protection in the labor market by legalizing them
as organizations which, unlike manufacturing associations, were not subject to
dissolution when they violated the antitrust laws. 0 Supplementing this provi-
sion, section 20 barred the issuance of federal injunctions prohibiting activities
such as strikes, boycotts or picketing, "in any case between an employer and
employees . . . or between employees, or between persons employed and
persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a dispute concern-
ing terms or conditions of employment .... ,,"7 In less than a decade, however,
gal.... " Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1S90), as amended, 15 US.C. § 1 (1958).
43. See 21 Cong. Rec. 2729 (1S90). See also United States v. South-Eastern Under-
writers Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), where the Court intimated that the legislative history
of the Sherman Act clearly shows that its applicability to combinations of labor as wll
as capital vas not an oversight.
49. United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724 (NJ). Ill. 1S94); United States v. Worldng-
men's Amalgamated Council, 54 Fed. 994 (C.C.E.D. La. 1S93); Blindell v. Hagan, 54
Fed. 40 (C.C.E.D. La. 1393).
50. 20S U.S. 274 (1903).
51. Id. at 292.
52. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
53. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1953).
54. Clayton Antitrust Act § 16, 38 Stat. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1953).
55. 3S Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1953).
56. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
57. 33 Stat. 733 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1953).
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any hint of blanket antitrust immunity for unions was explicitly dispelled. In
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,58 the Supreme Court restrained the
machinists' union from engaging in a secondary boycott stating:*
[B]y no fair or permissible construction can it [the Clayton Act] be taken as authorizing
any activity otherwise unlawful, or enabling a normally lawful organization to become
a cloak for an illegal combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade, as defined by the
anti-trust laws.59
Thus, according to Mr. Justice Pitney, neither the legitimacy of the union's
objectives, nor the nonviolent means employed to achieve these objectives
could have any effect on a determination of the legality of the activities in
question; the activities simply being within the interdict of the Sherman Act. 0
In respect to Section 20 of the Clayton Act, the Court, construing the act
strictly, found it applicable only in disputes between those parties standing
in the proximate relationship of employer and employee, and further ruled
that a union does not stand in this relationship when the dispute affects only a
few of its members.61 As a result, "Mr. Justice Pitney ... thereby reduced . . .
[Sections 6 and 20] of the Clayton Act to sound and fury, signifying nothing."0 2
The result of the Duplex case was to engender uncertainty. Dean Landis,
in an effort to explain some of the incongruities in the federal decisions during
the 1920's, distinguishes between restraints upon distribution and those upon
manufacture; 63 the former being violative of the Sherman Act regardless of
the lawfulness of the objectives or the peaceableness of the means employed,0 4
while the latter were lawful if incidental to the pursuit of legitimate union
objectives. 65 Organized labor, in an effort to clarify its status under the anti-
trust laws sought a statute which would grant unions relief from injunctions
and at the same time confer complete antitrust immunity. As a result, in
1932, the Norris-LaGuardia Act 0 was enacted.
58. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
59. Id. at 469.
60. "It is settled . . . that such a restraint produced by peaceable persuasion Is as
much within the prohibition as one accomplished by force or threats of force; and It is
not to be justified by the fact that the participants in the combination or conspiracy
may have some object beneficial to themselves or their associates which possibly they
might have been at liberty to pursue in the absence of the statute." Duplex Printing
Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. at 467-68. See also Landis, The Apex Case, 26 Cornell
L.Q. 191 (1941).
61. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. at 472.
62. Landis, supra note 60, at 198.
63. Id. at 201-05.
64. Id. at 202-03.
65. United Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457 (1924). In
this respect, Dean Landis also considers the two Coronado cases: Coronado Coal Co. v.
UMW, 268 U.S. 295 (1925); UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922); Landis,
supra note 60, at 201-05.
66. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 101-10, 113-15 (1958).
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3. Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932
The primary purpose of this act was to restrict the power of federal courts
to issue injunctions in labor disputes. 17 It reflected a change in congresional
policy and effectively resulted in federal support of labor unions. The anti-
trust portion of the act in substance provided that federal courts no longer
have jurisdiction to issue a restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction
upon the ground that any of the persons participating or interested in a labor
dispute constitute or are engaged in an unlawful combination or conspiracy because
of the doing in concert of... acts ...os8
which are in restraint of trade. Thus the intervention of the courts in union
controversies was terminated, the Supreme Court subsequently holding that
the Norris-LaGuardia Act effectively immunized such disputes from the cqui-
table jurisdiction of the antitrust laws and consequently the courts' most
powerful tool-the injunction,
The ultimate effect of granting labor organizations an exemption under the
antitrust laws has been characterized as "treating the Norris-LaGuardia Act as
pro tanto repealing the Sherman Act"'70 with respect to unions. The extent to
which this exemption applies is revealed by a series of Supreme Court decisions
between 1940 and 1945.
B. Judicial Immunity
In 1940 the Supreme Court decided the first case in which it attempted to
halt the use of the Sherman Act as a means of policing strikes affecting inter-
state commerce. In Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,7 1 the union, seeking to en-
force demands for a closed shop, engaged in a sit down strike that compelled
a shutdown of the factory. It was held that a restraint on the movement of
goods in interstate commerce resulting from this shut down was not illegal
and hence the petitioner was not entitled to treble damages under the Sher-
man Act. Even though a natural and probable consequence of the acts of
the strikers was to prevent substantial interstate shipments by the employer,
this was not the kind of restraint of trade or commerce at which the Sherman
Act was aimed; there must be in addition, the unlawful objective of un-
reasonably restraining competition. It was this concept which was adopted
by the Supreme Court, a year later, in United States v. Huttcheson, 2  and ex-
tended to what is the current labor antitrust exemption.
In the Hutcheson case, an employer involved in a jurisdictional dispute
between the carpenters' and machinists' unions assigned the controversial work
to the machinists. The carpenters' union then called a strike, picketed, re-
67. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 1, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1953).
63. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 5, 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 105 (1953).
69. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
310 U.S. 469 (1940).
70. Pound, Legal Immunities of Labor Unions 34 (1957).
71. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
72. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
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quested its members and others throughout the nation to boycott the employer's
product, and attempted to initiate sympathy strikes. Holding that labor
activities exempt from injunction by the Norris-LaGuardia Act were also totally
immune to the prohibitions of the Sherman Act, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
stated:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor
groups, the licit and the illicit under § 20 [of the Clayton Act] are not to be dis-
tinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or
wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular union
activities are the means.73
There is some dispute as to whether Hutcheson completely overruled the
Duplex decision.74 With respect to the Duplex interpretation of the Sherman Act
as it applies to labor unions, there is little doubt but that such interpretation is
overruled. 75 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, despite Mr. Justice Pitney's earlier hold-
ing to the contrary, found that what is on its face violative of the Sherman
Act is lawful for a labor organization if done in the pursuit of valid union
objectives. But precisely what such objectives might be was not stated. Rather
the entire concept was defined in terms of "self-interest"-the essence of the
present labor antitrust exemption. Contrariwise, it is not so clear that Ilut1cle-
son overruled Mr. Justice Pitney's narrow interpretation of a "dispute" within
the meaning of Section 20 of the Clayton Act. Duplex was decided before the
enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,76 while Hutcheson was not only de-
cided after its enactment, but after numerous decisions had, in accordance
with congressional intent, given a broad interpretation to the term "labor
dispute" as used in that act.77  Mr. Justice Frankfurter reasoned that
Section 20 of the Clayton Act must be read in the light of the broad congres-
sional policy toward labor as expressed in the* enactment of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.78 In effect then, the two acts were read as integrated statutes. 79
This interpretation has met frequent criticism 0 because the question arises:
Would it not have been more accurate for Mr. Justice Frankfurter to have
written that the Duplex interpretation of section 20 simply was incorrect?
The next major decision affecting union immunity was actually only an ap-
plication of the rule laid down by Hutcheson.8s However, it did attempt to clarify
the extent to which labor is exempt when it combines with nonlabor groups.
73. Id. at 232.
74. 254 U.S. 443 (1921). See also Carey, The Apex and Hutcheson Cases, 25 Minn. L.
Rev. 915, 922 (1941); Landis, supra note 60, at 212A-12B.
75. Landis, supra note 60, at 212B.
76. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-10, 113-15 (1958).
77. See Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., Inc., 311 U.S. 91
(1940); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938); United
States v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 47 F. Supp. 304 (NI). IMI. 1942), aff'd per curiam,
318 U.S. 741 (1943).
78. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 231.
79. Landis, supra note 60, at 212D.
80. See, e.g., Carey, supra note 74; Landis, supra note 60, at 212B.
81. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
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Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l B/d. of Elec. Workers 2 involved a situation
where the union arranged with contractors and manufacturers of electrical
apparatus to boycott out-of-city and nonunion goods in order to elevate the
status of its members by securing jobs and higher woridng standards. In
upholding the injunction against the electrical workers' union the Court held
that when the union combined with businessmen to restrain trade and eliminate
competition it lost the exemption conferred upon it in the Clayton and Norris-
LaGuardia Acts. Emphasizing the actual scope of the immunity at issue, the
Court ruled that the injunction, as issued by the district court, was too broad
and should be limited so as to prohibit only activities in which the union
engaged in combination with nonlabor groups5 3
A question originally posed by Mr. Justice Roberts' dissent,81 arises as
to whether the opinion of the Court should be limited to the facts presented
therein; i.e., would the exemption be lost in a situation where there is "an agree-
ment between one union and one employer requiring conduct whose object is
some direct market restraint.. . ,"s or would it be lost only as in the instant case,
where the agreement is between a union and several employers who are a
combination amongst themselves. The Report of the Attorney General's National
Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws implies that in cithcr case the exemp-
tion would be lost,58 but Archibald Cox's views are to the contrary.6 T As
yet the Court has not been squarely confronted with the problem.
C. Request for Legislation
The effect of these decisions was to make a basic delineation of the areas
and occasions in which the antitrust immunity of labor exists. The theories
behind Sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act83 and Section 5 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Acts9 were harmonized, and together produced the often quoted
principle that so long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine
with nonlabor groups, its activities in bona fide labor disputes shall not be
subject to either the damage or the injunction provisions of the antitrust
laws.90 The antitrust problem inherent in this rule, "one which leaves labor
unions free to engage in conduct which restrains trade,'*' was noted by the
Court in Allen Bradley but was reserved as "a question for the determination
82. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
83. Id. at 811-12.
84. Id. at 313-20.
S5. Att'y Gen. Natl Comm. Antitrust Rep. 297 (1955). (Emphasis added.)
86. Id. at 297-93.
S7. Professor Cox is of the opinion that the Allen Bradley decision would and should
be limited to its precise facts. Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws--A Preliminary Analysis,
104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 252, 271.
8S. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1958), 33 Stat. 733 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52
(195s).
89. 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 105 (195 ).
90. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 235-36.
91. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.. at 310.
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of Congress."9 2 It would appear that the answer to such a question lies either
in the area of antitrust revisions or labor reforms. But to date, the Court's
request for legislation has been interpreted almost entirely as an appeal for
labor statutes, the "antitrust" approach, with the exception of a few abortive
proposals, having been avoided.
IV. PROPOSALS AND CHANGES
A. Antitrust Approach
When the Hartley bill93 was passed by the House in 1947, it included provi-
sions which would have made antitrust laws applicable to certain union activi-
ties. The Taft-Hartley Law,9 4 as finally adopted, however, contained no such
antitrust sections. In 1950 Senator Robertson of Virginia unsuccessfully intro-
duced a bill 95 which would have restored the application of antitrust policies,
so far as labor unions were concerned, to their status before the enactment
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 98 This proposal, although emphasizing the public
character of the injury suffered from restraints on trade and commerce, in
effect, equated unreasonable restraints with unlawful union objectives. Under
such reasoning the antitrust exemption would be lost.
During the next few years sporadic attempts at similar legislation were
made but invariably met with failure. Two such bills, those of Representatives
Smith of Kansas97 and Hiestand of California 8 would have extended anti-
trust coverage to presently immune union activities. The latter sought to
accomplish this by repealing Sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act 9 and
amending Sections 1 and 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 100 The former was
substantially to the same effect. Finally, a third bill 1' which would have pro-
92. Ibid.
93. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1947). See also 93 Cong. Rec. 3656, 3671
(1947).
94. Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-44, 151-67, 171-87 (1958) (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
95. S. 2912, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). See also 96 Cong. Rec. 756 (1950) (intro-
ductory remarks). In substance, the bill provided as follows: "section 1 of the [Sherman
Act] . . . is amended . . . . Provided further, That when a labor organization or the
members thereof have unreasonably restrained trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, in articles, commodities, or services essential to the main-
tenance of the national economy, health, or safety, or any substantial segment thereof,
such conduct shall not be made lawful, and the jurisdiction of any court of the United
States to issue an injunction against any such conduct shall not be restricted or removed
... [by the Clayton or Norris-LaGuardia Acts] .'
96. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-10, 113-15 (1958). It should be noted, how-
ever, the validity of this statement depends upon the Duplex interpretation of §§ 6 and
20 of the Clayton Act.
97. H.R. 6515, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
98. H.R. 678, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
99. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1958); 38 Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52
(1958).
100. 47 Stat. 70, 73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 113 (1958).
101. S. 3227, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
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hibited compulsory unionism was introduced by Senator Goldwater of Arizona,
but it also was never enacted.
In September of 1961, Senator McClellan of Arkansas submitted a pro-
posal1'0 to prohibit certain activities of labor organizations which restrain
trade or commerce in industries engaged in transportation. The bill would
amend Sections 1, 3, and 8 of the Sherman Act'0 3 and Sections 6 and 20 of
the Clayton Act.10  What effect this legislative effort will have is entirely
speculative. But it does point out that "we need a rule of law to settle labor
disputes . . . including protection for the public."'u 5
B. Labor Approach
In prohibiting certain union activities, 0 0 Congress has, in effect, declared
that these activities are illegal, despite the lawfulness of the objectives they are
designed to achieve. Thus, under the Taft-Hartley Act federal district courts
have the power to issue injunctions upon the application of the National Labor
Relations Board in cases involving jurisdictional disputes107 and secondary
boycotts, s notwithstanding the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.1'3
Despite this means for curbing union activities aimed directly at suppressing
commercial competition, the actual effect on such practices is limited due to
the construction of the Taft-Hartley Act. Only those activities "'specifically
provided for' in the act""10 are prohibited. The result is as stated in Jolic t Con-
tractors Ass'n v. NLRB,"' that there are "numerous apparent incongruities."" 2
One of the more outstanding products of such incongruities was the "hot
cargo" clause. While Taft-Hartley attempted to bar certain types of secondary
boycotts, 13 it left others virtually untouched. One such loophole was utilized
by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and became known as the "hot
cargo" doctrine. Under this theory the union could refuse to handle cargoes
to or from firms involved in labor disputes and such right could be made a
matter of contract. This practice excluded competing products from the con-
sumer market and, if done by businessmen, would be an unreasonable restraint
102. S. 2573, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
103. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1, 3 (195S); 26 Stat. 210 (1S90),
15 U.S.C. § 7 (1953).
104. S. 2573, 87th Cong., 1st Ses. (1961).
105. 107 Cong. Rec. 1S943, 18946 (1961).
106. 61 Stat. 146 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1953) (Supp. II, 19S9-19CO).
107. 61 Stat. 146 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1953). In such case:, the Board
may petition the district court for an injunction.
103. 61 Stat. 146 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1953) (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
This section makes it mandatory upon the Board to seek an injunction 'where a secondary
boycott is alleged.
109. 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 105 (1953).
II0. NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 673 (1951).
111. 202 F.2d 606 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 824 (1953).
112. Id. at 612.
113. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1S3(b)(4) (1953) (Supp. 11, 1959-
1960). See also International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 US. 694 (1951).
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of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. n 4 It was not until the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, however, that such clauses
in collective bargaining contracts were made illegal."' Along with secondary
boycotts this act prohibited extortionate picketing"" and certain types of
organizational picketing." 7 Its major purpose, however, was to provide for
more democracy in labor union affairs." 8 The effectiveness of this law is now
being tested but due to its limited antitrust scope, i.e., primarily with respect
to the secondary boycott, it is doubtful that a solution to the labor antitrust
dilemma has been found.
V. FUTURE REMEDIES
When the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws made its recommendations in 1955 it indicated that "to the extent that
...commercial restraints [are] not effectively curbed . ..appropriate legis-
lation to prohibit these union efforts . . ."9 is needed. To satisfy this need
two major approaches 120 to the regulation of union economic influence have
developed:
(1) The application of antitrust policies to restrict the acts of organized
labor;
(2) The development of legislation outside of the antitrust laws, i.e., labor
reforms, to cope with the specific problem of the undesirable effects of union
power on the general public.
The latter theory has produced laws such as the Taft-Hartley l'2 and
Landrum-Griffin Acts,122 while the former has yet to meet with congressional
approval. True, present labor statutes would probably prevent situations like
those which occurred in the Apex' 2 3 and Hutcheson'24 cases, but many
114. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
115. 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (Supp. II, 1959-1960). See also Ryan,
Secondary Boycotts Under the New Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, 34 St. John's L. Rev. 42 (1959).
116. 73 Stat. 539 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 522 (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
117. 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (Supp. II, 1959-1960). See also
Wollett, Organizational Picketing and Related Activity, in Symposium on the Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 at 926 (1961).
118. See 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
119. Att'y Gen. Natl Comm. Antitrust Rep. 304 (1955).
120. See American Enterprise Ass'n, Bill Analysis--Antitrust Law & Labor Unions,
Rep. No. 12, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28 (1959 [hereinafter cited as AEA Bill Analysis].
121. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 151-67, 171-82, 185-88,
191-97 (1958) (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
122. 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
123. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940). The activities of the union In
Apex are no longer protected labor practices under Section 7 of the National Labor Rela-
tions. Act, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958). The Taft-Hartley
Act, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1958) (Supp. II, 1959-1960),
made the closed shop unlawful.
124. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941). Secondary boycotts were out-
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vital issues remain unresolved, many union restraints of trade in the product
market, unremedied.
How far should the "self-interest" concept be extended? Should a union
acting alone be able to provide an employer with a sheltered market in an
effort to get a share of the anticipated larger profit? How far may a union go
in resisting the application of technological advances in an effort to secure
more jobs for its members? Should the term "labor dispute," as it appears in
the Norris-La Guardia Act be more narrowly construed? These are questions
which still remain unanswered.
A. Antitrust Theories
Some authorities, such as Archibald Cox, have suggested that the key to such
problems lies in an attempt to give legislative recognition to the conflict be-
tween the congressional policies of encouraging effective collective bargaining
and promoting product market competition.Y He would therefore make a clear
delineation between the lawful and unlawful activities within the area of
conflict.126 While this proposal has the advantage of designating exactly what
lawed by the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 153(b)(4)
(1958) (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
125. See AEA Bill Analysis at 30-33.
126. See Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws--A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 252, 284 n.117 (1955), where this proposal is presented:
"Section 1. The Congress finds-
(a) It is the policy of Congress, set forth in the Labor-Management Relations Act
of 1947, to promote and encourage collective bargaining concerning wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment and, to that end, to -afeguard the right of
employees to form, join and assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their on.m choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the pur-
poses of organization, collective bargaining and other mutual aid and protection.
(b) It is also the policy of Congress set forth in the antitrust laws to prevent
monopoly and promote product market competition among employers in the sale of
goods and services.
(c) Labor organizations, acting alone and in combination with employers, have
sometimes gone outside the sphere of organization and collective bargaining and have
fixed prices, limited production, allocated territory or sales among employcro, and
imposed other like restraints on competition among employers in the product marlaet,
all being of a kind which would violate the antitrust laws if imposed by business groups.
(d) The policy of this Act is to prevent and punish such restraints without regu-
Iating the freedom of employees, labor organizations and their members to engage in
strikes, boycotts or other concerted activities for the purposes of organization and
collective bargaining or the negotiation and administration of agreements relating to
the wages and other compensation of employees, their hours and working conditions,
or their tenure and security of employment.
"Section 2. It shall be unlawful for a labor organization or its officers or members
to enter into any contract or agreement affecting interstate commerce which-
(a) fixes prices, or
(b) limits the volume of production or sales (othenwise than by establishing hours
of employment, overtime premiums, work loads, work standards, or measures for sharing
available work), or
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acts are permissible without regard to intent or purpose, it fails to distinguish
cases where the same act might at one time be committed to accomplish a
valid objective, e.g., the betterment of wages and working conditions, and at
another time, be aimed directly at obtaining an illegitimate one, e.g., the crea-
tion of a sheltered market 127 for management. Thus it appears that while Archi-
bald Cox would not approve of any blanket application of the antitrust laws to
labor, he offers as an alternative, a proposal, which itself, mandates blanket appli-
cation to certain union activities.
Another approach is that the undesirable aspects of labor power could be
eliminated by making the legality of these activities depend upon their pur-
pose and effects. 128 Advocates of this theory point out that the Iutcheson de-
cision,'1 29 which in effect, equated legitimate union objectives to self-interest,
rendered the legitimacy concept almost totally nugatory. Thus they urge that
Congress change the Hutcheson delineation of union antitrust immunity so
that if the immediate purposes are illegal under the Sherman Act, the exemption
would be lost, despite the fact that the ultimate purposes (wages and conditions
of employment) are valid objectives. In other words, "self-interest" should
not be the sole criterion for determining "legitimate union objectives" and
consequent antitrust immunity. The difficulty here is the method of proving
purposes in cases where both labor and management would benefit from the
same anticompetitive activity, e.g., where the union acting alone creates a
sheltered market.
(c) restricts the number or kind of employers or other persons who may engage
in any particular kind of business activity or for whom members of a labor organization
will work, or the area in which an employer or other person may sell goods or services,
or the persons with whom an employer may do business, or
(d) otherwise, but in like manner, limits access to a market other than a labor market
by employers and other persons engaged in business activity.
"Section 3. It shall be unlawful for a labor organization or its members or employees
to engage in a strike, boycott or other concerted activities where an object thereof is
to compel any employer to enter into a contract or agreement prohibited by Section 2,
provided that nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to prohibit a labor organi-
zation from excluding an employer from the market as an incident of a current dispute
with such employer concerning the association or representation of employees or their
terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee."
127. A sheltered market is a situation where unions have combined to restrain trade
through the boycott or similar devices so as to allow only the products and services of
an approved employer to be used within a given area. The purpose of such an activity
is to increase the employer's profits and consequently the union's proportionate share
through better wages, conditions etc. See also Cox, supra note 126, at 266-67.
128. See AEA Bill Analysis at 33-34. Advocates of this theory state that It emanates from
§ 6 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1958), as construed by the
Supreme Court in the Duplex case, 254 U.S. 443 (1921), namely, that the antitrust laws
should not be construed to forbid unions "from lawfully carrying out their legitimate
objects . . . ." Id. at 469. However, it should be noted that theirs is just one of the many
interpretations given to the Duplex decision.
129. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
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B. Labor Theories
Within the ranks of those who would restrict union anticompetitive prac-
tices through labor legislation, several approaches have also been proposed.
Some feel that there should be more democratic participation by local union
members in the union's important functions.130 Various methods to accom-
plish this have been offered, but in general, most would limit the influence of
the national union in favor of local autonomy. The main objection to this
plan is that it seeks to eliminate monopoly elements in the labor rather than
product market and hence is impracticable. Also, if a limitation on union size
is desirable, in what terms shall the measuring rod be expressed-by territory,
by industry, or by company?
A second theory' 3' seeks to restrict specific acts of organized labor through
statutory provisions similar to those found in the unfair labor practice section
of the Taft-Hartley Act.' 32 Again, however, such prohibitions would not nec-
essarily be limited to activities which restrain trade but would apply to all
undesirable manifestations of union influence, whether in the labor or
product market. Thus the criticism of impracticability is pertinent here also.
Finally, there are those who would curb union anticompetitive practices in-
dustry by industry. 33 In the past such efforts have resulted in legislation
such as the 1946 Communications Act Amendment, 3 4 which barred feather-
bedding in the broadcasting industries. Although this approach is of its nature
extremely limited in scope, it does possess merit in that certain industries
might need regulation more than others. But the question arises, if what is
sought is a remedy for anticompetitive practices in the product market, why
not apply this same reasoning more directly and propose antitrust legislation?
Perhaps this is what Senator McClellan had in mind when he introduced his
bill, "Antitrust Laws Amendment of 1961," which seeks to prohibit certain
restraints of trade by transportation labor unions.',
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether the answer to the problem of union activities which restrain trade
lies in the area of labor or antitrust legislation is, of course, "a question for
130. "One approach along these lines would be to formulate a special definition of
a 'labor organization' for the purpose of determining what types of unions are entitled
to the privileges and protections provided by the Taft-Hartley Act. Such a definition
would start with the eisting definition of 'labor organization' contained in the Taft-
Hartley Act .. . and (1) spell out the meaning of an organization 'in which employees
partidpate' and (2) distinguish the lawful purposes and/or functions of local unions from
those of national unions .... National unions could be limited to functions outside of
the direct employer-employee relationship. Signing a collective bargaining contract with
other than a bona fide local union would be unlawful." AEA Bill Analysis at 40.
131 Id. at 41-42.
132. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (195S) (Supp. II, 1959-1960).
133. AEA Bill Analysis at 42-43.
134. 60 Stat. S9 (1946), 47 U.S.C. § 506 (195S).
135. S. 2573, S7th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). See also 107 Cong. Rec. 1S943 (1961).
